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ABSTRACT
EFFICIENT AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE COMMUNITY MEDIATION
HANDE NUR ÇELEBİ
ECONOMICS M.A. THESIS, JUNE 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. SELÇUK ÖZYURT
Keywords: Alternative dispute resolution, mediation, mechanism design, efficient,
incentive compatible
Mediation is a highly popular alternative dispute resolution system and a growing indus-
try. I analyze mediation as a mechanism design problem and construct an individually
rational, efficient and incentive compatible mediation rule for a community when prefer-
ences over alternatives are common knowledge and ranking of the outside option is not.
Different than Kesten and Özyurt (2019), this paper offers a mechanism when the dispute
occurs among a community which has more than two parties. If there exist a single issue
to dispute, we cannot construct the intended mediation rule. However, if there are more
than one issue to dispute, under some assumptions we can find a possibility result.
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ÖZET
BİR TOPLUMDA VERİMLİ VE MANİPÜLASYONA KAPALI ARABULUCULUK
HANDE NUR ÇELEBİ
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, HAZİRAN 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi SELÇUK ÖZYURT
Anahtar Kelimeler: Alternatif uyuşmazlık çözümleri, arabuluculuk, mekanizma
tasarımı, verimli, manipülasyona kapalı
Arabuluculuk sistemi alternatif uyuşmazlık çözüm sistemleri arasında oldukça popüler ve
büyüyen bir endüstri haline gelmiştir. Bu makale, arabuluculuk sistemini bir mekanizma
tasarımı problemi olarak analiz ediyor ve bir topluluk için bireysel rasyonel, verimli ve ma-
nipülasyona kapalı arabuluculuk kuralı inşa ediyor. Tarafların arabuluculuğa konu olan
anlaşmazlık üzerindeki tercihleri herkes tarafından bilinirken, masadan kalkma haklarını
nasıl kullanacakları her taraf için özel bilgidir. Kesten ve Özyurt’un (2019) makalesinden
farklı olarak bu makale, uyuşmazlık ikiden fazla taraf arasında olduğunda dahi istenen
sonuca ulaşılacak bir mekanizma arıyor. Sonuçta, eğer taraflar sadece bir konu üzerinde
anlaşmazlığa düştüyse, istenen arabuluculuk kuralı bulunamıyor. Eğer anlaşmazlığa
düşülen konu sayısı birden fazlaysa, bazı varsayımlar altında istenen sonuca ulaşılıyor.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The need of more efficient and more flexible ways in legal systems helps to find an
alternative: mediation. Mediation is a rising topic in legal systems in all over the
world. In 1996, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Act is adopted by the U.S.
Congress and this act ensures that the federal courts have right to send a case to the
ADR agencies and even in some cases, the ADR process is mandatory 1. Also, the
courts can apply the ADR process by themselves. Since then, many of the departments
in the U.S. government such as U.S. Department of Labor and Department of the Air
Force has its own ADR programs. In 2017, 75% of the cases which were proceeded ADR
voluntarily and 55% of the cases which were proceeded ADR mandatorily were resolved
and approximately $15,500,000 and 14,000 days of attorney/staff time was saved in the
U.S. 2 In Turkey, the proceeding is newer. “The Code of Mediation in Law Conflicts”
is passed from the parliament in 2012. 3 In this code, the mediator and the mediation
process were defined. In 2018, the mediation also became mandatory for some cases in
Turkey.
Mediation can be explained as a way of ADR negotiating to resolve a dispute between two
or more parties under the supervision of an independent third party. The independent
third party, the mediator, should have certain conditions such as necessary training
which are specified by the laws. Mediation is different than litigation and it has many
advantages when it is compared to the traditional resolution methods. First, the parties
are not obliged to agree with the outcome of the mediation. There is always an outside
option such as litigation or simply, not resolving. Second, the mediator pursues the needs
and requests of the parties and tries to find an optimal solution. Third, since mediation
takes less time than a usual court process, it is cost-effective. Fourth, mediation process
is strictly confidential, there are no publicly available hearing. And, mediation is a
1Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.
2The United States Department of Justice.
3https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6325.pdf
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flexible system in which the parties have the right to negotiate issues that are not
directly related to the case.
It might be thought that the mediation process is usually between two parties such as
between spouses who are going to divorce or the employer and the employee. However,
there are many other cases which have multiple parties and need to be resolved by
mediation, for instance, businesses who have contributed to the same project or a
neighbourhood who have affected by the same change. Kesten and Özyurt (2019) paper,
which is mentioned in detail in the literature section, analyzes the two-people mediation
problem with an ordinal approach. This paper tries to extend their findings to a public
dispute. This paper analyzes the multi-party mediation problems with an ordinal
approach which is new in the literature and characterizes a strategy-proof, efficient
and individually rational mediation rule to solve them. The ordinal approach gives a
flexibility to dispose of specified utility functions.
The model consists of multiple parties who are in dispute and a mediator who runs the
negotiations. In the issue subject to negotiation,there are finitely many alternatives to
be the outcome which are relevant to the issue. The preferences of parties/negotiators
over alternatives are commonly known. However, not all alternatives are acceptable
for a negotiator. Mediation has always an outside option. Thus, if a mediator is
not satisfied with the outcome, she can pursue alternative dispute resolution ways.
The ranking of the outside option, in other words, the set of a negotiator’s accept-
able alternatives is each negotiator’s private information. The mediator’s aim is to
construct a rule which guarantees strategy-proofness, efficiency and individual rationality.
I use clones to analyze the problem at first. I define the clones as negotiators who
has exactly same preferences over alternatives and there is one different negotiator
who has exactly opposite preferences over alternatives. We can see this problem as
a employer-employees dispute. Employees are similar to each other and have similar
preferences over alternatives in an issue like the settlement of the wages. Employer is the
different one and has exactly opposite preferences over alternatives in the same issue. If
there exists a single issue, issue X in this environment I cannot find a strategy-proof,
efficient and individually rational mediation rule. Even if I adopt more issues in which
the ranking of the outside option is private information, the result does not change. To
guarantee the individual rationality, mediation rule f cannot give an outcome with an
x ∈ X which is not acceptable for at least one negotiator. Since preferences over issue
X{ox} is the same for all clones, the least accepting clone is binding for the outcome
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where ox is the outside option in issue X. Then the mediator solves the problem as if
there exist two negotiators: the first one is the least accepting clone and the second one
is the different negotiator.
Then, I adopt the second issue, issue Y . Negotiators rank the outside option as the
worst alternative in issue Y and it is publicly known. Monetary issues might be an
example for issue Y , i.e., if the issue is splitting an amount of money in a community, not
splitting and going to the costly litigation is the worst option for all negotiators. Issue
X may be the dispute about the location of the office, if negotiators are employees with
similar preferences and employer with exactly opposite preferences. In this environment,
the mediation rule offers a bundle (x,y) from the set of all available outcome bundles
XxY to the negotiators. The negotiators give information about their preference about
outside option in issue X to the mediator, and their preference about the outside option
in issue Y is known by the mediator. Mediator tries to prevent the utility increase by
lying. Again, the least accepting clone is binding for the outcome and the problem can
be solved as if there are only two negotiators.
I use logrolling condition to handle with the violation of strategy-proofness of an
outcome when efficiency and individual rationality is guaranteed. This condition leads
a negotiator to substitute his loss from less preferred x ∈X with taking more preferred
y ∈ Y where the outcome bundle is (x,y). The mediation rule constructs a precedence
order from the set of bundles which satisfies logrolling condition and specifies the
outcome from this order when there are mutually acceptable alternatives.
Then, I extend my findings to the negotiators who do not restrict their preferences,
i.e., there are no clones in this setting. The dispute does not mean exactly opposite
preferences over issue X any more. The dispute occurs when at least one negotiator’s
top alternative is different the others. Except this, the model is the same with the
clone model. If there exists a single issue, the I cannot find a strategy-proof, efficient
and individually rational mediation rule f , simply because if the mediation rule satisfies
efficiency and individual rationality, the rule cannot guarantee strategy-proofness when
there exist more than one mutually acceptable alternatives.
In the last section, I adopt one more issue, issue Y as I did in the clone model. The
preferences of negotiators about the outside option in issue Y is publicly known whereas
the ranking of ox is private information of each negotiator. I use a kind of logrolling
condition, partial logrolling, which is used for substitution when it is needed to guarantee
3
strategy-proofness while efficiency and individual rationality is satisfied. The mediation
rule constructs a precedence order over partial logrolling bundles by considering the join
semi lattice over alternatives in issue X and the outcome is specified according to this
order and the mutually acceptable alternatives.
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2. LITERATURE
Kesten and Özyurt (2019) is the main paper for this section. My thesis is an extension
of this paper. Two negotiators with exactly opposite preferences over alternatives in
an issue X are in dispute. The preferences are public information, but ranking of
the outside option is private for each negotiator. If there is a single issue to dispute,
the mediation rule f cannot give a strategy-proof, individually rational and efficient
outcome. If they add one more issue and the outside option is inferior for all negotiators
in that issue, there is a possibility result. They use logrolling bundles, and I adopt
this condition from their paper. They characterize a precedence order on logrolling
bundles. Efficiency, individual rationality and strategy-proofness are satisfied when the
mediation rule gives the outcome by using the precedence order over mutually acceptable
bundles. They proved that even if the preferences are not strictly opposite of each other,
we can eliminate inefficient alternatives and find strictly opposite preferences for two
negotiators. I inspired by their result when I use strictly opposite preferences in my
first two model. They adopt an ordinal approach which is different than bargaining
literature in general. And, I extend their model which is two-party mediation problem
to a community mediation problem.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) find that in a bargaining game, it is impossible
to find an ex-post efficient allocation mechanism when individual rationality and
strategy-proofness are satisfied. Mediation can be considered as a bargaining game
with outside option. This paper differs from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in two
points: first, the parties’ preferences are unknown to each other while preferences are
public information in this paper. Second, their construction has cardinal approach,
while this paper has an ordinal approach for the preferences. Bester and Warneryd
(2006) states that if the outside option is distributed probabilistically and it is private
information of the agents, the peaceful settlement is impossible even if it is ex-post
efficient. Compte and Jehiel (2009) use the opposite preferences and the outside option
as private information with cardinal approach in utilities.
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In matchings literature, the ordinal approach is more common than in bargaining litera-
ture. Kesten and Özyurt (2019) paper defines some special rules in the outcome family,
and one of them is negotiator-optimal rules. My model also allows me to define such rule
and this rule resembles the proposing-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm from Gale
and Shapley (1962). Single-issue mediation models in this paper and Kesten and Özyurt
(2019) have common characteristics with voting rules in some papers such as Moulin
(1980) and Ching (1997) Also, a special member of intended outcomes in my last model,
the join semi lattice can be constructed by using Borda count.
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3. SINGLE-ISSUE MEDIATION WITH CLONES
There exist n negotiators who are in dispute over a single issue and m available
alternatives to the issue. Negotiators could have the outside option, o, as an outcome
when they do not agree upon an alternative. Thus, the set M = {x1, ...xm,o} is the set
of all possible outcomes of the dispute.
n− 1 of the negotiators are clones of each other. Therefore, their preferences over
alternatives are the same. It is common knowledge that the preferences of clones and
the dissimilar negotiator over alternatives are diametrically opposed, i.e., clones strictly
prefer xk to xk+1 and the dissimilar negotiator strictly prefers xk+1 to xk. However,
their ranking of the outside option is private information for each of them. Thus, each
negotiator has m types, denoted as θxji , where i denotes the negotiator and xj denotes
the least acceptable alternative for negotiator i. For convenience, I assumed that each
negotiator accepts at least one alternative.
We seek individually rational, efficient and strategy-proof mediation rules in this environ-
ment. Before the construction, we need to consider that the least accepting negotiator
among clones is binding for us. Since we seek individual rationality, the mediation rule
cannot give an alternative which is unacceptable for at least one negotiator. To satisfy
this, the mediation rule should always give an alternative from the set of available
solutions for the least accepting negotiator, i.e., M
θ
xj
c
= {x1, ...xj ,o} where c denotes
the least accepting negotiator belongs clones and xj is the least acceptable alternative
for that binding clone. Then, we can shrunk the mediation process into two-people
single-issue mediation, θxjc and θxjd where c represent the least accepting clone and d
represents the dissimilar negotiator.
To construct the mediation rule, first we consider individual rationality and efficiency
and check for strategy-proofness later. Start with fixing θx1c . We need to consider each
θ
xj
d where j ∈ {1, ...,m}. Since the least accepting clone only accepts x1, if x1 is mutually
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acceptable for both of them, then the mediation rule gives x1 and otherwise it gives
o. At step 2, fix θx2c . If the set {x1,x2} is mutually acceptable, then the mediation
rule gives x1 or x2. If the only mutually acceptable alternative is x2, then it gives x2.
Otherwise, it gives o. Continue this way by fixing each θxjc and finding individually
rational and efficient alternatives for each case to reach the following matrix:
θx1d ... θ
xm
d
θx1c x1 ... ox
... ... ... ...
θxmc x1, ...,xm ... xm
For strategy-proofness, fix one of the negotiators’ type and check if the other negotiator
can be better-off by misrepresent his preferences. For instance, if the mediation rule,
µ, gives x1 where negotiators are θx2c and θ
x1
d , i.e., µ(θ
x2
c , θ
x1
d ) = x1, then θ
x1
d wants to
deviate to θx2d by not being truthful and can get x2 which is more preferable for θ
x1
d . On
the other hand, if µ(θx2c , θ
x1
d ) = x2, then θ
x2
c can state his preferences as θx1c and get x1
wihch is more desirable than x2 for him.
This kind of contradiction with strategy-proofness can be found in all profiles, i.e.,
(θxjc , θxkd ), that the individually rational and efficient mediation rule gives more than one
alternative as outcome. When we fix one of the negotiators’ type, the other negotiator
always wants to deviate to the main diagonal by lying. Thus, we could not construct an
individually rational, efficient and strategy-proof mediation rule in single-issue mediation
with clones.
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4. MULTI-ISSUE MEDIATION WITH CLONES
There exist n negotiators and two different issues, issue X and issue Y to dispute. There
are m possible outcomes for each issue. There are outside options in each issue, ox and
oy. If the settlement is not done in one of the issues, the outcome will be the outside
option of this issue. Then, X = {x1, ...,xm,ox} and Y = {y1, ...,ym,oy} are the sets of
all possible outcomes for each issue and X\{ox} and Y \{oy} are the sets of alternatives
that are available.
n− 1 of the negotiators have the same preferences over available alternatives in both
issues, i.e., they are clones of each other. The remaining negotiator has opposite
preferences. Same with the first model, it is common knowledge that the preferences
of clones and the dissimilar negotiator over alternatives are diametrically opposed, i.e.,
clones strictly prefer xk to xk+1 and the dissimilar negotiator strictly prefers xk+1 to xk
in X and clones strictly prefer yk to yk+1 and the dissimilar negotiator strictly prefers
yk+1 to yk in Y . The ranking of ox in X is private information of each negotiator while
oy is the inferior outcome for all negotiators and it is publicly known. Formally, yk θYi
oy for all i and all k ≤m. The preference ordering of each negotiator over alternatives in
issue Y is unique and publicly known and the preference orderings over alternatives in
X can be one of the m different orderings. Thus, each negotiator has m types, denoted
as θxji , where i denotes the negotiator and xj denotes the least acceptable alternative for
negotiator i. Θi denote the set of all possible types for negotiator i and Θ = Θ1x...xΘnis
the set of all type profiles. For convenience, I assumed that each negotiator accepts at
least one alternative.
< is the set of all complete and transitive binary relations over the bundles
(xk,yk) ∈ X × Y , R ∈ < and for two bundles b,b′ ∈ X × Y , b Ri b′ means b is at
least as good as b′ for negotiator i and P is a part of R and b Pi b′ means b is strictly
better than b′ for negotiator i. Λ is an extension map which assigns a non-empty set
Λ(θi)⊆< of admissible orderings over bundles to all negotiators and types.
9
If an alternative is ranked higher than the outside option ox for negotiator i, this alter-
native is acceptable for i. A(θi) = {x ∈X|xθiox} is the set of all acceptable alternatives
in X for each negotiator i and type θi ∈ Θi. For each type profile θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Θi,
A(θ) = {x ∈X|xθiox∀i ∈ I} is the set of mutually acceptable alternatives in X.
Definition 1 The extension map Λ is consistent if the following holds for all i, θi ∈ Θi
and all Ri ∈ Λ(θi) :
(i) Monotonicity: For any x,x′ ∈ X and y,y′ ∈ Y with (x,y) 6= (x′,y′), (x,y)Pi(x′,y′)
whenever [xθix′orx= x′] and [yθiy′ory = y′].
(ii) Deal Breakers: For any y,y′ ∈ Y \{oy}, (x,y)Ri(x′,y′) whenever x ∈ A(θi)∪{ox},
x′ /∈ A(θi) and x 6= x′.
(iii) Logrolling: For any i, there exist a one-to-one mapping ti :X→ Y such that for all
θi ∈Θi, Ri ∈ Λ(θi) and all x,x′ ∈ A(θi) with xi x′,
(x′, ti(x′))Ri(x,ti(x))
.
Monotonicity is a sensible assumption, since one always want to take a bundle that
has more preferred alternative of at least one issue. Deal breakers assumption can be
interpreted as one never accepts a bundle that has an unacceptable alternative for her
in X no matter which yk ∈ Y is given in that bundle. Logrolling is the most important
assumption that helps to guarantee strategy-proofness. If a negotiator gets a lower
ranked but acceptable x ∈ X, she can substitute the loss with getting a higher ranked
y ∈ Y . Negotiators can trade between x and y. The formal definitions below are the
conditions that I seek in the mediation rule.
Definition 2 The mediation rule f is strategy-proof if for all i and all θi ∈Θi, f(θi, θ−i)
Ri f(θ′i, θ−i) for all Ri ∈ Λ(θi), θ′i ∈Θi and all θ−i ∈Θ−i.
Definition 3 The mediation rule f is individually rational if for all i and all (θi, θ−i)∈Θi,
f(θi, θ−i) Ri (ox,oy) for all Ri ∈ Λ(θi).
Definition 4 The mediation rule f is efficient if there exists no (θi, θ−i)∈Θi and (x′,y′)∈
X×Y such that (x′,y′) Ri f(θi, θ−i) for all Ri ∈ Λ(θi) and all i ∈ I, and for at least one
i ∈ I, (x′,y′) Pi f(θi, θ−i) for some Ri ∈ Λ(θi).
The aim is to characterize a mediation rule in which to be better off by lying is not
possible for negotiators, i.e., to announce the ranking of the outside option in issue X
truthfully is the dominant strategy equilibrium. As in the first model, the least accepting
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clone is binding for the mediation outcome. The mediation rule cannot give an alternative
which is not acceptable for at least one person. Moreover, the least accepting clone is
always among the non-accepting negotiators if an alternative is not in the set of mutually
acceptable alternatives. Thus, one can solve the mediation problem as if there exist two
negotiators who are the least accepting clone and the dissimilar negotiator.
To illustrate, a simple example which has three negotiators and two alternatives for each
issue is considered. Assume that negotiator 1 and negotiator 2 are clones of each other
and negotiator 3 is the dissimilar one. Their rankings over alternatives are as follows:
• θ1, θ2 : x1 θ1,2 x2 and y1 θ1,2 y2 θ1,2 oy
• θ3 : x2 θ3 x1 and y2 θ3 y1 θ3 oy
ox does not exist in the ranking, because it is public information and it can be ranked
right after the top alternative for a negotiator or as the worst option. Each negotiator
has two different types according to the ranking of the outside option. For instance, the
types of negotiator 1 are θx11 and θ
x2
1 and the preferences orderings for types are x1 θ
x1
1 ox
θx11 x2 and x1 θ
x2
1 x2 θ
x2
1 ox respectively. Suppose that negotiator 1 is the least accepting
clone. The mediation rule f will give an outcome
θx23 θ
x1
3
θx11 (ox,y) (x1,y2)
θx21 (x2,y1) (x1,y2) or (x2,y1)
When all alternatives in X are acceptable for everyone, the logrolling condition states
that if x1 θx21 x2, then (x2,y1) Ri (x1,y2) should be satisfied and if x2 θ
x1
2 x1, then (x1,y2)
Ri (x2,y1) should be satisfied. The mediator can give any bundle from the set of logrolling
bundles, {(x1,y2),(x2,y1)} for f2,1 and it will be strategy-proof, efficient and individually
rational.
Theorem 1 The mediation rule f is individually rational, efficient and strategy-proof if
and only if the following hold:
(i) If j < k, then fj,k = (ox, y)
(ii) If j = k, then fj,k = (xj ,ym+1−j)
(iii) If j > k, then fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂B and there exists a complete, transitive and
anti-symmetric precedence order . on B such that
fj,k =
 fj−1,k iffj−1,k .fj,k+1fj,k+1 otherwise
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where the least accepting clone is θxjc and the dissimilar negotiator is θxkd .
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5. SINGLE-ISSUE MEDIATION WITHOUT RESTRICTION
Now, we change our first construction and abandon from any restriction upon any
person’s preferences. There are n negotiators and m alternatives over an issue x. Each
negotiator has strict preferences over alternatives. We define the dispute different than
the case with the clones. Dispute occurs when the first best alternative of at least one
negotiator is different than the others’. Thus, the dispute does not restrict any ordering
except the negotiators’ first best. We can come up with two questions: First, what if
only rankings over outside option, ox, is private information? Second, what if rankings
over all preferences are private information? Actually, the first question’s answer implies
the second’s.
If rankings over ox are the only private information, we could not find any strategy-proof,
individually rational, and efficient mediation rule. If we try to construct such mediation
rule f , we can start with assuring individual rationality and efficiency. For individual
rationality, the mediation rule f shoud not give any alternative worse than ox. For
efficiency, f should give an alternative which is mutually acceptable for everyone. If
there exist only one mutually acceptable alternative, f gives this. If there are more than
one mutually acceptable alternative and some of them are inefficient, f picks one among
the efficient alternatives. If there are more than one mutually acceptable alternative and
any of them is not inefficient, f picks one of them to give. If there does not any mutually
acceptable alternative, then f should give ox.
Now, we try to find a strategy-proof rule among individually rational and efficient rules.
If there is not any mutually acceptable alternative, f should give ox and no one will be
better off by lying. Because, if someone accepts more than his original type and leads to
a mutually acceptable alternative, the rule f gives that one. However, it is not mutually
acceptable alternative for him in truth, so he would not deviate. If there is only one
mutually acceptable alternative, f should give this alternative. Then, if a negotiator
deviates to a type that accepts more, f gives either the same alternative or an alternative
that this negotiator ranks below the first alternative. If a negotiator deviates to a less
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accepting type, then f gives ox, because there is not a mutually acceptable alternative
any more. However, the first alternative is ranked above ox for the negotiator. Thus,
no one deviates to a better alternative by lying. If there are more than one mutually
acceptable alternative, f should choose one of them. Let’s say {xi,xk} are mutually
acceptable alternatives and wlog they are efficient. Since preferences over alternatives
are strict and there is a dispute, at least one negotiator prefers xi which is not the given
one, more than xk, the given one. Thus, the negotiator can deviate to a type that does
not accept xk and f should give xi. Then, he will be better off by lying. If the rule f
gives xi, the same situation occurs again. Thus strategy-proofness is violated in all cases
which has more than one acceptable and efficient alternatives. We can illustrate that
with an example:
Suppose there are 3 people and 3 different alternatives in issue X. The ranking of each
negotiator over alternatives is public information, thus, the rankings are as follows:
• θ1 : x1 θ1 x2 θ1 x3
• θ2 : x2 θ2 x3 θ2 x1
• θ3 : x3 θ3 x1 θ3 x2
Since the ranking of the outside option, o is private information of each negotiator, each
has three different types according to their acceptable alternatives. In this environment,
individually rational and efficient alternatives, i.e., mutually acceptable alternatives at
each type profile as follows:
[θx33 ]
θx22 θ
x3
2 θ
x1
2
θx11 o o o
θx21 o o o
θx31 o o x3
[θx13 ]
θx22 θ
x3
2 θ
x1
2
θx11 o o x1
θx21 o o x1
θx31 o x3 x1,x3
[θx23 ]
θx22 θ
x3
2 θ
x1
2
θx11 o o x1
θx21 x2 x2 x1,x2
θx31 x2 x2,x3 x1,x2,x3
where the row negotiator is θ1, column negotiator is θ2 and table negotiator is θ3 and
superscript shows the least acceptable alternative for each type of each negotiator. From
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individually rational and efficient alternatives, we try to find a strategy-proof rule. For
contradiction, suppose the mediation rule gives x1 at the type profile (θx31 , θ
x1
2 , θ
x1
3 ). In
this case, θx12 ) could be better off by revealing her type as θ
x2
2 ) and getting x3. Thus,
giving x1 is not a strategy-proof rule. Now suppose the mediation rule gives x3 at the
type profile (θx31 , θ
x1
2 , θ
x1
3 ). In this case, (θ
x3
1 could be better off by revealing her type
as (θx21 and getting x1. Thus, giving x3 is not a strategy-proof rule. At the end, any
mutually acceptable alternative in the type profile (θx31 , θ
x1
2 , θ
x1
3 ) cannot give a strategy
proof rule.
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6. MULTI-ISSUE MEDIATION WITHOUT RESTRICTION
The model is the same with multi-issue mediation model with clones up to the assump-
tion of restricted preferences. This model applies no restriction upon the negotiators’
preference orderings. In other words, having diametrically opposed preferences is not
obligatory in this setting. Thus, the dispute cannot be defined as diametrically opposed
preferences. Now, the dispute occurs when at least one negotiator’s top alternative is
different than others. Preference ordering of each negotiator over available alternatives
and oy, the outside option in issue Y are common knowledge and the order of ox, the
outside option in issue X is private information of each negotiator as in the previous
model. The notation is adopted from the previous model.
For simplicity, I use three alternatives for each issue and three negotiators to dispute.
To be in a dispute, at least one of the negotiator’s top alternative in one of the issues
is different than others. Denote Ti as the top two alternatives for each negotiator i
independent from their types. Formally,
Ti = {x ∈X|∃x′ ∈Xs.t.xθix′andx 6= x′}.
θ∗ is a join semi lattice that compares all x,x′ ∈X such that {(x,x′)} ∈ 3⋃
i=1
Ti. θ∗ should
make pairwise comparison of top two alternatives of each negotiator. A(θi) is defined
as the set of all acceptable alternatives for all i and all θi. Now, a restricted acceptable
alternatives set is introduced. AR(θi) consists of pairs of acceptable x’s that negotiator i
ranks reversely compared to the join semi lattice, θ∗. Formally,
AR(θi) = {(x,x′) ∈X2|xθix′andx′θ∗x∀x,x′ ∈ A(θi)andx 6= x′}
And, the set ΘRi is the set of all types for each negotiator i who contradicts with the join
semi lattice θ∗ at some point. Formally,
ΘRi = {θi ∈Θi|AR(θi) 6= ∅}
The new logrolling condition is constructed in the light of the sets that are defined above
and the join semi lattice θ∗:
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Definition 5 The extension map Λ satisfies partial logrolling if there exist a one-to-one
mapping t :X→ Y such that ∀θi ∈ΘRi , ∀Ri ∈Λ(θi) and all (x,x′) ∈AR(θi) with xθix′ we
have
(x′, t(x′)) Ri (x,t(x)).
The partial logrolling condition enables us to compare and trade the bundles in which
the x’s are ordered differently in θ∗ and θi for all i.
Definition 6 The pair of the extension map and the function (Λ, t) is partially consistent
if the followings hold for all i ∈ I, θi ∈Θi and all Ri ∈ Λ(θi):
(i) Monotonicity
(ii) Deal breakers
(iii) Partial Logrolling
and, Bp(t) = {(x,t(x)) ∈X×Y |(Λ, t) is partially consistent }.
Monotonicity and deal breakers are defined as exactly the same with the Multi-issue
mediation with clones part. Bp(t) denotes the set of partially logrolling bundles when
(Λ, t) is partially consistent.
Theorem 2 The mediation rule f is efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational if
and only if the following hold:
(i) A(θ) = ∅, then f = (ox,y) for some y ∈ Y
(ii) A(θ) = {x}, then f = (x,t(x)) ∈Bp(t)
(iii) |A(θ)| > 1, then ∃ a complete, transitive and antisymmetric precedence order . on
Bp(t) that satisfies xθ∗x⇒ (x,t(x)). (x′, t(x′)) such that
f = max
A(θ,t)
.
where A(θ, t) = {(x,t(x)) ∈Bp(t)|x ∈ A(θ)} ⊆Bp(t).
If there does not exist a mutually acceptable alternative in issue X, then the mediation
rule should give the bundle that contains the outside option, ox. The rule cannot give a
bundle which contains an alternative x 6= ox, because this alternative x is unacceptable
for at least one negotiator for sure and thus, it contradicts with individual rationality.
If there exist only one mutually acceptable alternative in issue X, then the mediation
rule should give the partial logrolling bundle that contains that x ∈ X. It cannot give
a different x′ ∈ X, because x′ is unacceptable for at least one negotiator for sure and
thus, it contradicts with efficiency and individual rationality. If there exist more than
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one mutually acceptable alternatives, the mediation rule should choose which x to give
in the outcome bundle according to the partial logrolling condition. When the rule
guarantees efficiency and individual rationality, it needs partial logrolling to satisfy the
strategy-proofness.
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7. CONCLUSION
This paper seeks a mechanism that gives efficient, individually rational and incentive
compatible mediation rule when there exist more than two parties in dispute. It differs
from Kesten and Özyurt’s (2019) paper, because their paper analyzes the mediation
problem with only two parties. In this sense, this paper can be seen as an extension of
Kesten and Özyurt (2019).
Along the paper, the ranking of the outside option for each negotiator is private infor-
mation for that negotiator. The paper contains four different parts. First, it analyzes
a single-issue mediation problem with clones. In this case, there exist a single issue in
dispute and all people but one in the community have exactly same preferences over the
alternatives in the issue and and one have exactly opposite preferences over the same
alternatives. In such environment, the mediator cannot find the intended mediation rule.
Second, I add a second issue to dispute and I still have the clone assumption. Now, the
paper analyzes a multi-issue mediation problem with clones. I know the ranking of the
outside option of all negotiators in the new issue. The outside option is the worst one
for all. In that case, the mediator can find the intended mediation rule if the preferences
satisfy monotonicity, deal breakers and logrolling assumptions. Since the least accepting
clone is binding for the outcome, the problem can be shrunk into two-party mediation
problem and these first two results of the paper can be derived from Kesten and Özyurt
(2019).
Third, I drop the clone assumption, then negotiators do not have a restriction upon
their preferences. Now the paper analyzes a single-issue mediation problem with no
restriction. Since there cannot be exactly opposite preferences over alternatives for
disputing parts, the dispute occurs unless all negotiators’ top alternatives are the same.
In such an environment, the mediator cannot find the intended mediation rule. In other
words, even if the dispute is minimal, there does not exist an efficient, individually
rational and incentive compatible mediation rule. Forth and last, the paper analyzes
three-party multi-issue mediation problem with no restriction. The multi-party analysis
19
is left for publication. Again, there exist a second issue and the outside option of
the second issue is worst outcome for that issue for all negotiators. In that case, the
mediator can find the intended mediation rule if the preferences satisfy monotonicity,
deal-breakers and partial logrolling assumptions.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Proof of "if" part: According to the outcomes on the right hand side assumptions
of the theorem, the mediation rule f always gives more preferred bundles than (ox,oy).
Thus, f is individually rational.
For efficiency, suppose that both of the least accepting clone and the dissimilar negotiator
accept all alternatives in X. Then, by assumption (iii), µ(θxmc , θ
x1
d ) ∈B, say b. Suppose
that the mediation rule f gives a different bundle, a, from the set of logrolling bundles,
B. In such case, one of the negotiators will certainly be worse off. The reason is that
preferences of the negotiators over logrolling bundles are diametrically opposed, i.e.,
if a Rc b, then b Rd a for all bundles in B. Suppose now that f gives (ox,y) where y
∈ Y \ {oy}. In that case, each of the negotiators will be worse off by deal-breakers
assumption. Suppose that f gives bundle c which is neither a logrolling bundle nor
consists of the outside option. The consistency assumption puts no restriction on
comparing such a bundle with a logrolling bundle. Thus, there exists a negotiator i
∈ {c,d} and a consistent preference ordering Ri such that b Pi c. Then, the nego-
tiator i will be worse off. We can apply this to all types that accept less alternatives in X.
Moreover, If there does not exist mutually acceptable alternatives inX, f gives (ox,y).
Suppose f gives some other bundle b, then one of the negotiators will be worse off by
deal-breakers assumption. Thus, f is efficient.
To find the mediation rule f is strategy-proof, without loss of generality, we can consider
the least accepting clone’s deviations. There exist three cases: j < k, j = k, and j >
k. Suppose that the least accepting clone’s type is θxjc with j < k. Since there is not
any mutually acceptable alternative in X, f gives (ox,y). If θ
xj
c deviates to some xj′
with j’ = k, then he gets (xj′ ,ym+1−j′). However, θ
xj
c will be worse off, by deal-breakers
assumption, because xj′ is an unacceptable alternative for him. If θ
xj
c deviates to some
xj′ with j’ > k, then f gives some xc ∈ X where c ∈ {k, .., j′} by adjacency. However, all
xj′s are unacceptable for θ
xj
c and he will be worse off by deal-breakers assumption. Thus,
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θ
xj
c with j < k has no profitable deviation from µ(θxjc , θxkd ). For the second case, assume
that the least accepting clone’s type is θxjc with j = k. In that case, f gives (xj ,ym+1−j)
and there exist only one mutually acceptable alternative, xj , in X. If θ
xj
c deviates to
some xj′ with j’ < k, then f gives (ox,y) and this bundle is clearly less preferred than
(xj ,ym+1−j) for θ
xj
c , by deal-breakers assumption. If θxjc deviates to some xj′ with j’
> k, f gives some xc ∈ X where c ∈ {k, .., j′} by adjacency. Then, θxjc gets either the
same bundle (xj ,ym+1−j) or a bundle with an unacceptable alternative for him, i.e., he
is either indifferent or worse off in that case. Thus, θxjc with j = k has no profitable
deviation from µ(θxjc , θxkd ).
Before the last case, we need to specify some characteristics of the mediation rule f . We
can construct a region called value region for a logrolling bundle in any mediation rule.
Definition 7 Given a mediation rule f , the value region of a bundle a ∈ B, V (a),
consists of bundles in the intersection of all columns lower than a and all rows higher
than a.
Lemma 1 For two bundles on the main diagonal, a and b, the adjacent rule that is
described in Theorem 1 safisfies:
(i) a does not exist outside of V (a)
(ii) a and b do not exist in V (a)∩V (b) together
(iii) If a is above b on the same column or a is left of b on the same row, then a is above
b on the main diagonal.
Proof.
(i) According to the construction of the rule f , any bundle on the main diagonal
continues to be seen only left of itself or below itself. Since all logrolling bundles
are unique in the main diagonal, it could not exist outside V (a).
(ii) let a = fk,k and b = fr,r with k < r on the main diagonal. We can construct the
proof of condition (ii) in three cases. First, suppose a (fra,s) and b (frb,s) are on
the same column in V (b)∩ V (a) and a is above b. Then, r ≤ ra < rb ≤ m. By
adjacency, if we move along row r from b= fr,r to fr,s, the left bundles are ranked
either the same or higher. Then, at column s, if we move from fr,s to a = fra,s,
the below bundles are ranked either the same or higher, again by adjacency. Thus
a .b must hold by transitivity. It contradicts with the fact that b .a which must
hold because b is below a at the column s.
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Second, suppose a= fs,ca and b= fs,cb are on the same row in V (b)∩V (a) where a
is the left of b, i.e., 1≤ ca < cb ≤ k. By using the same argumentation with the first
case of (ii), if we move along column k from a to fs,k, fs,k is ranked either the same
or higher than a, by adjacency. Then we move from fs,k to b= fs,cb along row s, b is
ranked either the same or higher than fs,k, by adjacency. Thus, b .a must hold by
transitivity. This contradicts with the fact that a .bmust hold since a is the left of b.
Lastly, suppose a and b are neither on the same column nor row. Without loss of
generality, let a= fra,ca and b= frb,cb where r≤ ra < rb ≤m and 1≤ ca < cb ≤ k. In
such case, if we move from b = fr,r to fr,ca along row r, i.e., if we move from right
to left, fr,ca is ranked either the same or higher than b= fr,r, by adjacency. Thus,
a .b holds. On the other hand, if we move from a = fk,k to frb,k along column k,
frb,k is ranked either the same or higher than a = fk,k. Then, continue to move to
the left, to b= frb,cb , b= frb,cb is ranked either the same or higher than frb,k. Thus,
b .a holds. Then, we have a contradiction.
(iii) This condition follows from condition (ii). If a and b are on the same column and
a is above b, we need to show that a is above b on the main diagonal. Suppose
that a is below b on the main diagonal for a contradiction. Let b= fk,k and a= fr,r
where k < r. Then a and b cannot be in V (b)∩V (a) together, by (ii). Moreover, a
cannot be in V (b)\V (a), by (i). Thus, there is not any possibility for them to be
in the same column, contradicts with the assumption at the beginning. The same
reasoning is valid for the case that a and b are on the same row.
Finally, suppose that the least accepting clone’s type is θxjc with j > k and let c ∈ B
the bundle when θxjc reports his type truthfully. If θxjc deviates to some j’ with j’ <
k, then he will be worse off by getting (ox,y) (deal-breakers assumption). If textitθ
xj
c
deviates to j′ with j > j′ ≥ k, he gets some bundle, say a. Then, a is above c because
of j > j′. Then, a appears above c on the main diagonal, by condition (iii) of Lemma
1. By logrolling, cc a. Thus, deviating from bundle c to bundle a is not profitable for
θ
xj
c . If θxjc deviates to some j′ with j′ > j to get a bundle called b. b appears below
c on the main diagonal, because of condition (iii) of Lemma 1. By conditions (i) and
(ii), bundle c must be in region I, while bundle b must be in region II. Then, no matter
where bundle c is in region I, bundle b has an unacceptable alternative of x for θc. Then
θ
xj
c will not deviate from c to b. Hence, f is strategy-proof.
Proof of "only if" part: First of all, we need to prove that if the mediation rule f is
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individually rational, strategy-proof and efficient, then the least accepting clone is binding
for us. Since f is individually rational, it never gives a bundle worse than (ox,oy). Thus,
f is individually rational for all other types of clones. Since f is efficient for the least
accepting clone, if there exists an improvement for any other type of clone, then θd will
be definitely worse off. Thus, f cannot provide any pareto improvement for any of them.
Finally, f is strategy-proof for the least accepting clone. Without loss of generality, we
can pick one of the clones that has a different type. Then we should consider three cases:
If he deviates to a more accepting type, the outcome does not change, because f gives a
bundle which has a mutually acceptable option in X, to preserve efficiency. If he deviates
to a less accepting type but more than the least, the outcome does not change by the
same reason. If he deviates to a type which accepts less than the least, since the rule
is strategy-proof for for the least accepting clone at the beginning, he cannot be better
off by lying. Thus, the least accepting clone is binding. Then, we can start to prove the
conditions:
(i) Since f is individually rational and efficient, and since there does not a mutually ac-
ceptable alternative for the least accepting clone θxjc and θxkd where j < k, f should
give ox for the issue X. Because, any outcome inX other than ox will be unaccept-
able for one of the negotiators and contradicts with the deal-breakers assumption.
Since f is strategy-proof, it should give the same y in issue Y . Without loss of
generality, suppose f gives y′ 6= y at µ(θxjc , θxkd ) where j < k for a contradiction.
Then, one of the negotiators should strictly prefer y′ more than y, because of the
diametrically opposed preferences. If θxjc prefers y′ more than y, then θxkd prefers y
more than y′. The latter one can deviate to θxk′d where j < k′ to get (ox,y) and will
be better off. On the other hand, if θxkd prefers y′ more than y, θ
xj
c can deviate to
θ
xj′
c where j′ < k to get (ox,y) by the same reasoning. Thus, the mediation rule f ,
should give (ox,y) at every type bundles, i.e., (θ
xj
c , θ
xk
d ) with j < k.
(ii) Since f is individually rational and efficient, there exist a unique mutually accept-
able alternative of issue X where j = k which is xj and f should give that. For
y, suppose f gives some y′ 6= ym+1−j at (θxkc , θxkd ) for a contradiction. The bundle
(xk,y′) is no longer in B. Since there is no restriction on how to rank bundles which
are not in B, we can always find a bundle which is ranked higher than (xk,y′).
Thus, to preserve strategy-proofness, fk+1,k should also be (xk,y′). By the same
arguments above, fk+1,k+1 should also be (xk,y′). However, xk is not mutually
acceptable for fk+1,k+1. Hence, it contradicts with the rule that is individually
rational and efficient. This proof holds for any k ∈ {1, ...,m}.
(iii) We want to prove that if there is an individually rational, strategy-proof and efficient
mediation rule f , then the rule is adjacent, i.e., fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂B where
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j < k, and there exist a precendence order on the elements of B which is complete,
transitive and strict. First we have a lemma to prove:
Lemma 2 Suppose fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂B holds where j < k. Let a and b are
bundles in B. If a is above b on the main diagonal, then a is above b on all diagonals
that a and b are both on.
Proof. Suppose a is above b on the main diagonal and a and b appear on the
diagonals up to diagonal t According to the adjacent rule, a and b can move to
the left or to the down. First, suppose a moves to the left on the main diagonal.
Then, regardless of how b moves, a is still above b on the second diagonal. Second,
suppose a moves to the down. Then, there are two cases: 1) a and b are on the
same row, and 2) a is above b. If the first case occurs, then b should drop down
to continue existing. Thus, a is above b again. If the second case occurs, then it is
obvious. We can do this up to diagonal t, which is the last diagonal than a and b
both appear.
Now we can do the condition (iii)’s proof step by step:
1. Adjacent rule: We will show that individually rational, efficient, and strat-
egy proof mediation rule f gives fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B where j > k. For in-
duction, we should first prove that this statement holds for j = k+ 1. Because
we know that the elements at the main diagonal are all belong to B. Suppose
fj,k /∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B where j = k+ 1 for contradiction. Since the rule f is in-
dividually rational and efficient, it should give some x∈ {xk,xk+1}. Suppose f gives
some y. If fj,k = (xk,y), y c ŷk should be satisfied for strategy-proofness of f , be-
cause otherwise θk+1c deviates to θkc and will be better off by getting fj−1,k = (xk, ŷk).
Suppose yc ŷk. With this, deviation will be reversed, i.e., θkc deviates to θk+1c to get
(xk,y). This contradicts with strategy-proofness of f . If fj,k = (xk+1,y), y d ŷk+1
should be satisfied for strategy-proofness of f , since otherwise θkd deviates to θ
k+1
d
to get (xk+1, ŷk+1). In this case, however, θk+1d gets (xk+1, ŷk+1) and will deviate to
θkd to get (xk+1,y). This contradicts with strategy-proofness of f . Since we could
not find such y, fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B must hold for j = k+ 1.
By induction, suppose fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B holds up to j = k + b. We
should show that it holds for j = k + b+ 1. Suppose for a contradiction that
fj,k /∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B where j = k+ b+1. First consider fj,k ∈ B and WLOG,
consider θc. There exist three cases: first, suppose fj,k+1 %c fj−1,k %c fj,k. We
can find a consistent preference relation which satisfies fj−1,k c fj,k. Then θjc will
be better of by stating himself as θj−1c , contradicting with strategy-proofness of f .
Second, suppose fj,k %c fj,k+1 %c fj−1,k. Because of the same reason above, there
exist a consistent preference relation which satisfies fj,k c fj−1,k so θc deviates from
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fj−1,k to fj,k to be better off, contradicting with strategy-proofness of f . Third,
suppose fj,k+1 %c fj,k %c fj−1,k. Because of the same reason above, we can find a
preference relation such that fj,k c fj−1,k, so θc wants to deviate from fj−1,k to
fj,k. Thus, fj,k cannot be in B. Consider fj,k /∈ B.
2. Precedence Order: Now I know that the desired mediation rule f should give
fj,k ∈ {fj−1,k,fj,k+1} ⊂ B ∀j > k. For a well-defined mediation rule the mediator
needs an order on these pairs of {fj−1,k,fj,k+1}. First I will show that the order is
asymmetric. Suppose that a.b and b.a hold together for a contradiction. Suppose t
is the smallest diagonal which a and b are adjacent to each other at and without loss
of generality, fj−1,k−1 = a and fj,k = b, i.e., a is above b. This means b Rc a when
they are both acceptable for θc. Suppose that a.b at t. By assumption, there exists
some t′ > t which a and b are adjacent to each other at, fp−1,r−1 = a and fp,r = b,
and b.a holds, i.e., fp,r−1 = b. By lemma 2 and adjacent rule principle, p > j. a and
b are both acceptable for θxp−1c . Thus, θxp−1c can deviate to θxpc and get b instead of
a and would be better off by lying. I contradicts with the strategy-proofness of the
rule.
Now I will show the transitivity of the precedence order .. Suppose a. b and b . c
hold alongside with c . a for a contradiction. WLOG, assume that t is the first
diagonal which a and b are adjacent to each other at and b is above a, fj−1,k−1 = b
and fj,k = a.
Suppose that b and c are adjacent to each other and b is above c at some t′ > t. If
c exists in t′, it should exist and below b at t. Since a is adjacent to and below b at
t, c should be below a at t. By assumption of a.b, b can only move to the left and
by c .a, c can move to the left and below. Since a is in between b and c at t and b
and c cannot move towards each other, b and c cannot be adjacent in some t′.
Suppose that b and c are adjacent to each other and b is below c at some t′ > t, say
fp,r = b and fp−1,r−1 = c. Suppose a is adjacent to c at t′′ > t′. Otherwise is not
possible, because b is in between c and a at t. c is surely above row p−1 because
b . c. p < j because of the value region of b and a is surely below row j. At t′′, a
and c cannot be adjacent.
Suppose that b and c are adjacent to each other and c is above b at some t′ < t,
say fp,r = b and fp−1,r−1 = c. If a is at t, then it should be at t′ by lemma 2, and
a should be below b at t′.By the assumption of c.a, c and a should be adjacent to
each other at some t′′. t′′ < t′ is not possible, because b is in between c and a at t′.
Then it must be the case that t′′ > t. However, by b. c, c can only move to the left
and cannot exist below row p−1 at t′′. By a. b, a should exist below row p at t′′.
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Thus, c and a cannot be adjacent to each other. The last point which is b and c
are adjacent to each other and c is below b at some t′ < t can be proved easily with
the same arguments.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Proof of "if" part: If there does not exist a mutually acceptable alternative,
the rule should give ox, because otherwise someone leaves the table. If there exist
one or more mutually acceptable alternative, say x, it is sure that this alternative is
better than ox. Since oy is inferior the mediator can pick an alternative y ∈ Y and it is
better than oy for all negotiators. (ox,y) Ri (ox,oy) ∀i and (x,t(x)) Ri (ox,oy) ∀i by
monotonicity. Thus, the mediation rule characterized by the three points of the theorem
2 is individually rational.
For efficiency, take the case where each negotiator accepts all alternatives. Then, the
mediation rule f should give b ∈ A(θ, t). Suppose for a contradiction, f gives b′ ∈ A(θ, t)
and b Ri b′ for at least one negotiator i, because of partial logrolling. Thus b′ Ri b
cannot be true for all i. Suppose for a contradiction, f gives (ox,y), the mutually
acceptable alternative x in b is better than ox for all i. y is random in (ox,y) and all
y ∈ Y \{ox} is efficient, there exists a negotiator i, y′ ∈ b θi y. Thus, b Ri (ox,y) for
that i. Suppose for a contradiction that f gives c = (x′,y′) /∈ A(θ, t). The mediation
rule does not put a restriction on how b and c are compared. Thus, there exist a
negotiator i and Ri such that b Pi c. Thus, that i will be worse off. This process
can be applied when there exist a mutually acceptable alternative. Suppose there
does not exists a mutually acceptable alternative and f gives (x′,y′) 6= (ox,y). There
exists a negotiator i who does not accept x′. By deal breakers and monotonicity, that i
will be worse off. Thus, the mediation rule f that is characterized by theorem 2 is efficient.
For strategy-proofness, we will check each scenario. WLOG, suppose that the outcome
is (ox,y) and negotiator i can manipulate the system. If negotiator i lies and reveals
her type as a less accepting type than her true type, she will get (ox,y) again. Thus,
she does not manipulate. If she reveals her type as a more accepting type than her true
type, she can get either (ox,y) or (x,t(x)). In former case, she does not need to deviate.
In latter, since she ranks ox higher than x, by deal breakers, she will be worse off. Thus,
again she does not manipulate.
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WLOG, suppose that the outcome is (x,t(x)) and there exists only one mutually
acceptable alternative and negotiator i can manipulate the system. If she lies and reveals
her type as a less accepting type than her true type, she will get (ox,y). Since x is
the mutually acceptable alternative, we know that negotiator i ranks x higher than ox.
Thus, by deal breakers and monotonicity, (x,t(x)) Ri (ox,y) and she will be worse off.
Thus, she does not manipulate the system in that way. If she reveals her type as a more
accepting type, she can get either (x,t(x)) or (x′, t(x′)) ∈ A(θ, t). In former case, she
does not need to deviate. In latter, since x′ /∈ A(θi), by deal breakers, she will be worse
off. Thus, she does not manipulate.
WLOG, suppose that the outcome is (x,t(x)) and there exist more than one mutually
acceptable alternative and negotiator i can manipulate the system. If she lies and reveals
her type as a less accepting type than her true type, then she can get (ox,y), (x,t(x)) or
(x′, t(x′)) ∈A(θ, t). In the first case, she will be worse off by monotonicity. Thus she does
not manipulate in this way. In the second case, she gets exactly same bundle, thus she
does not need to deviate. In the third case, she will deviate if and only if (x′, t(x′)) Ri
(x,t(x)). By partial logrolling, it is satisfied if and only if x θi x′ and x,x′ ∈A(θi). Thus,
any less accepting type of negotiator i than x does not accept x′. It is a contradiction.
Thus she does not manipulate in that way.
If negotiator i lies and reveals her type as a more accepting type than her true type, she
can get either (x,t(x)) or (x′, t(x′))∈A(θ, t). In former case, she does not need to deviate.
Thus, she does not manipulate the system in that way. In latter case, if x′ /∈ A(θi), then
by deal breakers, she does not manipulate the system in that way. If x′ ∈ A(θi), then
(x′, t(x′)) Ri (x,t(x)) should be satisfied for a manipulation. By partial logrolling, x θi x′
and x′ θ∗ x should be satisfied. However, if x′ θ∗ x is satisfied and x′ ∈ A(θi), f should
give (x′, t(x′)), instead of (x,t(x)). It is a contradiction. Thus, she does not manipulate
in that way. Thus, the mediation rule that is characterized by theorem 2 is strategy-proof.
Proof of "only if" part: By individual rationality and efficiency, if A(θ) = ∅, the outcome
bundle should be (ox,y). Since there is no mutually acceptable alternative in X, ox is
a better outcome for at least one negotiator i for all x ∈ X. All y ∈ Y are efficient for
the outcome by construction. By strategy-proofness, the rule cannot give different y’s at
different type profiles with A(θ) = ∅. Thus, for all θ with A(θ) = ∅, the mediation rule
f should give (ox,y).
By efficiency, individual rationality and consistency of preferences, if A(θ) is singleton
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and is equal to x, then fx = x. Suppose θxii gets (xi,y). θ
xi+1
i gets either (xi, t(xi)) or
(xi+1, t(xi+1)). In former case, by monotonicity, y should be equal to t(xi). In latter
case, by strategy-proofness, y should be equal to t(xi). Thus, for all θ with singleton
A(θ), the mediation rule f should give (x,t(x)).
By efficiency and individual rationality, if |A(θ)| > 1, then, fx = x where x ∈ A(θ).
WLOG, a negotiator can take the same bundle with one less accepting type of her, say
(x,y) or she can take a bundle with her different acceptable alternative, say (x′,y′). If she
takes the former, there is no problem. If she gets the latter, then by strategy proofness,
she should rank (x′,y′) over (x,y) while we know that she ranks x over x′. The mediator
should gather all problematic types such as the more accepting type of the negotiator
above in a set and problematic couples such as (x,x′) in another set and construct a
partial logrolling condition according to these substitution need of strategy-proofness.
Then, the third part of the theorem will be satisfied.
31
